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FACTUAL FRIVOLITY: SANCTIONING CLIENTS UNDER
RULE 11-Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications
Enterprises, 892 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 3235
(1990).
Abstract" In Business Guide; Ina v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises; the Ninth
Circuit held that clients can be sanctioned under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, if
they fail to make an objectively reasonable inquiry to ensure that documents submitted to
a court are well grounded in fact. In this case, the Ninth Circuit rejected the subjective
good faith standard adopted by the Second Circuit, which held in Calloway v. Marvel
Entertainment Group, that clients can be sanctioned only if they knowingly submit claims
that are not well grounded in fact. This Note approves of the Business Guides decision,
but suggests that courts should be careful to hold clients to a lower level of objectively
reasonable inquiry relative to attorneys.
Federal courts have long had an inherent power to levy sanctions in
response to abusive litigation practices.' In 1918, Congress added to
this power when it granted federal courts the statutory authority to
impose court costs on an attorney who "unreasonably" and "vexa-
tiously" multiplied proceedings to increase the cost of litigation.2 In
1938, the Supreme Court adopted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11
(Rule 11), which gave federal courts the authority to subject an attor-
ney to disciplinary action if the attorney violated a subjective standard
of good faith.'
For many years these sanctions were the primary tools available to
judges to protect the judicial system from abusive tactics. Judges and
attorneys, however, increasingly became dissatisfied with the effective-
ness of these sanctions.4 In 1983, this dissatisfaction led to the amend-
ment of Rule 11. The amendment included two significant changes
that raised the standards of conduct expected of attorneys and clients.
First, it replaced the requirement that attorneys have a subjective good
faith belief in the accuracy of factual allegations, with a requirement
that attorneys make an objectively reasonable inquiry to ensure that
1. United States v. Hudson, I1 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) ("To fine for contempt... [and]
inforce the observance of order.., are powers which cannot be dispensed with .... "); see also
Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-65 (1979) (discussing inherent powers).
2. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1927 (West Supp. 1989); see also Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis; 118
F.R.D. 189, 195 (1988).
3. FED. R. CIV. P. 11, 97 F.R.D. 165, 196 (1983). For a thorough history of the original Rule
11, see Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement Some "'Striking" Problems with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MiNN. L. REv. 1 (1976).
4. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some "Chilling" Problems In The
Struggle Between Compensation And Punishment, 74 GEo. L.J. 1313 (1986); see also Cooter &
Gell v. Hartmarx, 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2454 (1990).
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their factual allegations are accurate.' Second, the rule permits sanc-
tions against clients.6 While the amended rule requires attorneys to
act according to an objectively reasonable standard of conduct to
avoid sanctions, it does not clearly define the standard of conduct
expected of clients.7 As a result of this lack of guidance, courts have
been left to fashion the standard of conduct that clients must follow to
avoid sanctions.
The two circuits that have explicitly addressed this issue have
adopted different standards of conduct for clients. In Calloway v.
Marvel Entertainment Group,8 the Second Circuit held that clients do
not have the same duty as attorneys to make an objectively reasonable
inquiry into the factual basis of a document submitted to a court.
Instead, the Second Circuit held clients to the subjective good faith
standard of the old Rule 11. Clients can be sanctioned only if they
have actual knowledge that a document is not well grounded in fact.9
In Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises, "
the Ninth Circuit rejected the Second Circuit's view, and applied the
new objective standard of reasonable inquiry to clients."1 The Business
Guides court held that clients, like attorneys, may be sanctioned if
they fail to make a reasonable inquiry into the factual basis of any
court document to ensure that it is not frivolous. 12
In Business Guides, the Ninth Circuit correctly chose to apply the
objective standard of reasonable inquiry to clients. This standard is
supported by the language of amended Rule 11, and it best accom-
plishes the purposes of the rule. Judges, however, should not apply
the objective standard as rigidly to clients as they do to attorneys.
Rather, courts should hold clients to a reduced level of objectively
reasonable inquiry, to be determined according to a uniform set of
factors. Holding clients to this lower level of inquiry best accom-
plishes the public policy of holding attorneys to a higher standard of
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. 165, 198 (1983) [hereinafter
Committee Note].
6. Id. at 200.
7. In a speech about amended Rule 11 the Reporter of the Federal Rules Advisory
Committee (Advisory Committee) focused entirely on the behavior of attorneys, which may
indicate that the Committee overlooked the rule's impact on clients. See A. MILLER, THE
AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING
EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY 11 (1984).
8. 854 F.2d 1452 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom., Pavelic & Leflore v.
Marvel Entertainment Group, 110 S. Ct. 456 (1989).
9. Id. at 1474.
10. 892 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 3235 (1990).




Rule 11 Sanctions Against Clients
care than clients, and also mitigates the rule's propensity to discourage
legitimate litigation, create excessive satellite litigation, and harm the
attorney-client relationship.
I. BACKGROUND: AMENDED RULE 11
A. General Provisions and Purpose
Rule 11 provides that
[t]he signature of an attorney or party [on a] pleading, motion, or
other paper [submitted to a court certifies] that to the best of the signer's
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is
well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose .... [If a] paper is
signed in violation of this rule, the court... shall impose upon the
person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate
sanction. 1
3
This version of the rule, adopted in 1983, differs from the old rule in
two significant ways. First, the rule adopts an objective rather than a
subjective standard of conduct, and second, it explicitly authorizes
sanctions to be imposed against clients.' 4
The Supreme Court adopted these changes to achieve three goals: to
deter frivolous suits,'5 to compensate the targets of such suits,16 and to
punish violators. 7 The Advisory Committee Note accompanying the
1983 amendment stressed the goal of deterrence. The Committee
explained that "[g]reater attention by the district courts to pleading
and motion abuses and the imposition of sanctions when appropriate,
should discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and help to streamline
the litigation process by lessening frivolous claims or defenses. '."'
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. (emphasis added). It is beyond the scope of this Note to discuss the
appropriate standards for legally frivolous or improper purpose violations of Rule 11.
14. Id. Both versions of the rule can be found at 97 F.R.D. 165, 196 (1983). Another
significant change was the inclusion of mandatory sanctions. If a violation is found, a court must
impose sanctions. Judges have discretion to choose the appropriate sanction. Id. at 197, 200.
15. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx, 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2454 (1990) (central purpose of the Rule is
deterence); Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1536 (9th Cir. 1986)
(primary goal is deterrence); see also Comment, A Uniform Approach to Rule 11 Sanctions, 97
YALE L.J. 901, 905 (1988).
16. Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., 836 F.2d 866, 879 (5th Cir. 1989) (compensation for
reasonable expenses).
17. Mercury Serv. v. Allied Bank of Tex., 117 F.R.D. 147, 157 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (Rule 11
contemplates punitive sanctions).
18. Committee Note, supra note 5, at 198.
Washington Law Review
B. The Role of the Objective Standard
To accomplish the purposes of amended Rule 11, the Advisory
Committee replaced the subjective standard with the objective stan-
dard.19 Before the 1983 amendment, attorneys who signed a pleading
were held to a subjective standard of good faith. They were not
required to make a reasonable inquiry into the factual basis of a plead-
ing. Instead, attorneys were prohibited from submitting pleadings
they knew lacked good ground for support.2" The objective standard
in amended Rule 11 requires attorneys or parties who sign a court
document to make a reasonable inquiry to ensure that any papers sub-
mitted to a court are well grounded in fact.21 If they do not make such
inquiry, and the documents are frivolous, the court may assess sanc-
tions. Attorneys and parties who sign court documents are clearly
held to this objective standard, yet the appropriate standard of con-
duct for clients who do not sign a court document is not defined by the
rule.
The objective standard, which at least applies to attorneys and sign-
ing parties, is more stringent than the old good faith test. The drafters
of the rule intended it to trigger the application of the rule more often,
thereby increasing the number of violations.22 This intent has been
realized, as evidenced by the dramatic increase in Rule 11 cases since
the amendment.23
C. Problems of the Objective Standard
Courts and commentators have recognized three potential problems
resulting from the adoption of the objective standard in the amended
Rule 11: the rule may chill legitimate litigation, create excessive satel-
lite litigation, and harm the attorney-client relationship. 24 The Advi-
19. Id.
20. Attorneys were also prohibited from interposing pleadings for delay. FED. R. Ov. P. 11,
97 F.R.D. 165, 197 (1983); Nelken, supra note 4, at 1315.
21. The rule also requires those who sign a court document to ensure it is well grounded in
law, and not submitted for an improper purpose. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
22. Committee Note, supra note 5, at 198-99. The infrequent use of Rule 11 was largely
attributed to the difficulty in proving bad faith on the part of an attorney who signed a frivolous
pleading. See Robinson v. National Cash Register, 808 F.2d 1119, 1126-27 (5th Cir. 1987).
23. During the 45 years between its initial passage in 1938 and its amendment in 1983, only
23 cases were reported. Risinger, supra note 3, at 1. In contrast, from the time of the amendment
of Rule 11 on August 1, 1983, to December 15, 1987, 688 Rule 11 cases were reported. Vairo,
supra note 2, at 199. Rule 11 violations were found in 57.8% of the cases where sanctions were
requested. Id.
24. AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION, THE REPORT OF THE
THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11, at 77, 84-85 (S.
Burbank reporter 1989) [hereinafter Burbank]; Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct.
942
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sory Committee attempted to address the rule's potential to discourage
legitimate litigation by pointing out that "the rule is not intended to
chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal
theories."2 Despite this admonition, the rule may discourage some
legitimate claims.2 6
The Committee also expressed concern that the objective standard
would spawn excessive satellite litigation, which results when extra
hearings or discovery requests are needed to determine whether a Rule
11 violation has occurred.27 The rule may also harm the attorney-cli-
ent relationship.28 This harm can occur both at the outset of litigation
if an attorney aggressively screens the allegations of a client to avoid
sanctions, or at the end of litigation if violations are found. At that
point, the attorney and client may become adversaries as each
attempts to blame the other.2 9 This threat, as well as the others posed
by Rule 11, must be resolved when selecting the appropriate standard
of conduct for clients.
D. Application of Rule 11 to the Factual Claims of Clients
Although Rule 11 allows clients who do not sign court documents
to be sanctioned for factually frivolous suits, it does not clearly indi-
cate the standard of conduct required of these clients.30 Only the Sec-
ond31 and Ninth3 2 Circuits have addressed this question directly.
33
2447, 2454 (1990) (the rule "must be read in light of concerns that it will spawn satellite
litigation and chill vigorous advocacy"); see also Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., 836 F.2d 866,
877 (5th Cir. 1988) (discussing chilling); Muthig v. Brant Point Nantucket, 838 F.2d 600, 607
(Ist Cir. 1988) (discussing satellite litigation).
25. Committee Note, supra note 5, at 199.
26. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243,254 (2d Cir. 1985) (Eastwayl)
(doubts must be resolved in favor of the signor to avoid chilling); see also Nelken, supra note 4, at
1338.
27. Committee Note, supra note 5, at 201; see Quadrozzi v. City of New York, 127 F.R.D. 63,
79 n.29 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (discussing satellite litigation). For a statistical profile indicating an
infrequent use of Rule 11, see Burbank, supra note 24, at 60-61.
28. Burbank, supra note 24, at 85-86.
29. Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 854 F.2d 1452, 1473 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd in
part on other grounds sub nor., Pavelic & Leflore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 110 S. Ct. 456
(1989).
30. FED. R. Crv. P. 11.
31. See Calloway, 854 F.2d at 1473.
32. See Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., 892 F.2d 802 (9th Cir.
1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 3235 (1990).
33. Other circuits have issued sanctions against clients. Some courts have focused on the
attorney's behavior, or on the behavior of both the client and attorney, without delineating the
level of inquiry expected of each. See, e.g., Robinson v. National Cash Register Co., 808 F.2d
1119, 1131 (5th Cir. 1977) (focusing on attorney); Cleveland Demolition v. Azcon Scrap, 827
F.2d 984, 988 (4th Cir. 1987) (focusing on attorney and client). Other courts have focused on the
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1. Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment Group: The Subjective
Standard
In Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment Group,34 Northern J. Callo-
way claimed that the Marvel Entertainment Group (Marvel) had
infringed his copyright in a script for a proposed movie titled "The
Skyrider. ' ' 35 Calloway asserted that his signature had been improperly
affixed to a contract that transferred rights in the movie to Marvel.36
The district court determined that there was no factual basis for Callo-
way's allegation,37 but found that Calloway had not lied about his
claim, and so had not acted in bad faith.3 8 Despite this finding, the
court fined him $100,0O0.39 The district court applied the objective
test to hold that Calloway had failed to make a reasonable inquiry into
the factual basis of his claim, and had submitted facts he should have
known were not true.4°
The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the district court should
not have applied the objective test. Instead, the court determined that
client conduct should be measured by a subjective standard of good
faith. 1 The court based this conclusion on two grounds: public policy
and the language of the Advisory Committee Note accompanying the
1983 amendments. First, the court discussed the public policy of
holding attorneys to a higher standard of care than clients. The court
reasoned that attorneys should be held to a higher standard of conduct
because of their responsibilities as licensed professionals and officers of
the court.42 Second, the court found support for the good faith stan-
dard in the language of the Advisory Committee Note. The Commit-
tee Note advised that sanctions should be imposed on a party where
appropriate under the circumstances. As guidance for this proposi-
tion, the Committee cited Browning Debenture Holders' Committee v.
client's behavior, apparently applying the objective standard, but without explaining its
application. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Fernandez, 830 F.2d 952, 956 (8th Cir.
1986).
34. 854 F.2d 1452, 1473 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nor., Pavelic &
Leflore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 110 S. Ct. 456 (1989).
35. Id. at 1456.
36. Id. at 1455-56.
37. Id. at 1468 (plaintiff also claimed the contract had been altered and its contents had been
misrepresented).




42. Id. Attorneys should know when conduct violates Rule 11, and when the "attorney fails
to advise an unwary client of the wrongfulness of such conduct, the burden of sanctions should
fall entirely upon the attorney." Id. at 1474-75.
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DASA Corp.43 The Browning court held that a client could not be sanc-
tioned under 28 U.S.C. § 1927' for the wrongful conduct of an attor-
ney, unless the client was personally aware of or responsible for the
conduct.4" Analogously, the Calloway court concluded that under the
amended Rule 11, clients should not be sanctioned unless they "know-
ingly authorize or participate in the filing of a paper that violated Rule
11.146
2. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications
Enterprises: The Objective Standard
In Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enter-
prises,47 the Ninth Circuit rejected the Second Circuit's subjective
good faith approach. Instead, the court applied the objective standard
of reasonable inquiry."s This standard provides for sanctioning clients
if they submit factually frivolous claims to a court and fail to conduct
a reasonable investigation into the factual basis of the claims.
In Business Guides, the plaintiff corporation sued Chromatic Com-
munications for copyright infringement.49 Business Guides alleged
that several typographical errors in the listings of businesses in its
computer catalogue appeared in identical form in Chromatic's com-
puter catalogue.5" Business Guides claimed this could have happened
only if Chromatic had directly copied Business Guides' catalogue.
This copying would constitute copyright infringement.5' The errors
that were allegedly copied, however, turned out not to be errors at all,
but rather accurate information. Consequently, Business Guides had
no factual basis to claim or prove copyright infringement. The district
court dismissed Business Guides' claim, and sanctioned the company
over $13,000 for failing to make the necessary reasonable inquiry into
the factual basis of its claim.52 Business Guides appealed, asserting
that clients should be held to the subjective good faith standard of
43. 560 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1977); see Committee Note, supra note 5, at 200.
44. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1927 (West Supp. 1989); see supra note 2 and accompanying text.
45. Browning, 560 F.2d at 1089.
46. Calloway, 854 F.2d at 1474.
47. 892 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. CL 3235 (1990).
48. Id at 812.
49. Id. at 804.
50. Id. These typographical errors are referred to as "seeds." Business Guides and its parent
company, Lebhar-Friedman, claimed to be experts and pioneers in the "seeding" method, in
which "seeds" are intentionally planted in a publication so that if they appear in exactly the same
form in a competitor's publication, there is strong evidence that the original publication was
copied.
51. Id at 804.
52. Id. at 807.
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conduct.53 The Court of Appeals rejected this argument. Applying
the objective standard, the court found that because a court clerk
spent only one hour making phone calls to determine that the alleged
errors were accurate information, Business Guides also could, and
should, have discovered the mistake. Business Guides' failure to dis-
cover the mistake was particularly egregious due to the company's
extensive copyright litigation experience. 4
Like the Second Circuit's ruling in Calloway, the Ninth Circuit's
decision rested on public policy and an interpretation of the language
of Rule 11 and the Advisory Committee Note. The court first pointed
out that the purpose of the 1983 amendment was to replace the old
subjective standard with the new, more stringent objective standard to
deter frivolous litigation." The court reasoned that applying the
objective standard to represented parties would best effectuate Rule
SlI's goal of deterring frivolous suits, because it would encourage cli-
ents to exercise greater vigilance when investigating their own
claims. 6 The court also rejected the Second Circuit's view that
because attorneys should be held to a higher standard of conduct than
clients, the conduct of clients should be measured according to the less
stringent subjective standard of good faith.57 The court concluded that
the objective standard already accommodates a client's reduced
responsibility. It based this conclusion on the Advisory Committee's
admonition that reasonableness should be determined according to the
particular circumstances. Since clients and attorneys act under differ-
ent circumstances, the court reasoned that what is objectively reason-
able for a client may not be objectively reasonable for an attorney. 8
In addition to public policy, the Ninth Circuit found support for the
objective standard in the language of the rule and the Advisory Com-
mittee Note. The court first emphasized that the rule does not provide
a separate standard of conduct for clients.5 9 The court reasoned that
since the drafters provided just one standard, the rule must prescribe
similar standards for attorneys and clients.' The court further dis-
agreed with the Second Circuit's view that the Advisory Committee's
53. Id. at 809.
54. Id. at 812.
55. Id. at 808.
56. Id. at 812.
57. Id. at 810.
58. Id. The Ninth Circuit also emphasized that it would be inconsistent to give clients the
benefit of the good faith standard, but hold pro se litigants to the objective standard. Id. at 811.
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cite to Browning Debenture Holders' Committee v. DASA Corp.,6 sup-
ported the subjective good faith standard.62 Instead, the Ninth Circuit
interpreted the Committee Note's cite to Browning as merely reinforc-
ing the notion that clients could be sanctioned. The court found the
bad faith element of Browning unexceptional, as all cases prior to the
amendment had also required bad faith.63 Finally, the Ninth Circuit
found support for the objective standard in the Advisory Committee's
direction that the good or bad faith of a violator be considered when
fashioning the appropriate sanction. The court reasoned that since
good faith is considered at the sanctioning stage, it should not be the
focus when determining whether a violation of the rule's objective
standard has occurred."4
II. ADOPTING THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD: LANGUAGE
AND PUBLIC POLICY
In Business Guides, Inc v. Chromatic Communications Enter-
prises,65 the court correctly applied the objective standard of reason-
able inquiry to clients. The objective standard comports with the
language of Rule 11 and the Advisory Committee Note, and the stan-
dard best accomplishes the purposes of Rule 11. Clients should not,
however, be held to the same level of objectively reasonable inquiry
into the factual basis of claims as attorneys. The public policy of hold-
ing attorneys to a higher standard of care than clients, and of avoiding
the problems associated with Rule 11, requires that a reduced level of
reasonable inquiry be applied to clients.
A. Support for the Objective Standard
1. Language of Rule 11
Rule 11 provides a single standard. The rule requires an attorney or
party who signs a court document to make a reasonable inquiry to
ensure that the document is well grounded in fact.6" If there is a viola-
tion of the rule a court must "impose upon the person who signed it, a
represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction."'67 This provision
can be interpreted in two ways. The first interpretation, which favors
61. 560 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1977).
62. Business Guides, 892 F.2d at 811; see supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text
(discussing Browning).
63. Business Guides, 892 F.2d at 811.
64. Id at 810.
65. 892 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 3235 (1990).
66. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
67. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (emphasis added).
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the subjective standard applied in Calloway, indicates that the objec-
tive standard of conduct requiring reasonable inquiry is applied only
to the signer of a paper submitted to the court. From this assertion it
follows that a client who does not sign a court document should not be
held to the objective standard.
The better interpretation of the rule, however, recognizes that Rule
11 explicitly authorizes the sanctioning of a nonsigning represented
client. This interpretation presumes that the drafters of the rule would
not prescribe a separate standard of conduct for nonsigning clients
without defining that standard. The Ninth Circuit adopted this
approach in Business Guides when it explained that the rule sets forth
just one standard of conduct,68 and that a client who violates this stan-
dard should be sanctioned.
2. Language of the Advisory Committee Note
a. Guidance for Application of Rule 11 to Clients
The Advisory Committee provided little guidance for sanctioning
clients. The Committee Note states that "it may be appropriate under
the circumstances of the case to impose a sanction on the client."69 To
help define the appropriate circumstances for client sanctions the
Committee cites Browning Debenture Holders' Committee v. DASA
Corp.70 In Calloway, the Second Circuit read the holding in Browning
to mean that a client can be forced to pay attorney's fees under 28
U.S.C. § 1927, only if the client is personally aware of, or responsible
for, the bad faith actions of the client's attorney.7' The Calloway court
interpreted the Committee's cite to Browning as an indication that the
subjective standard should be applied to clients. According to this
interpretation, clients can be sanctioned only if they violate the subjec-
tive good faith standard by being personally aware of, or responsible
for, the actions of their attorney that violate Rule 11.72 In Business
Guides the Ninth Circuit found the bad faith element of Browning
insignificant, because all cases imposing sanctions before 1983 required
68. Business Guides, 892 F.2d at 809. Adhering to the single standard of Rule 11 also
comports with the Supreme Court's requirement that Rule 11 be interpreted according to its
plain meaning. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx, 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2453 (1990).
69. Committee Note, supra note 5, at 200.
70. Id. (citing Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir.
1977)).
71. Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 854 F.2d 1452, 1474 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd in
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a bad faith violation of the rule.73 The court concluded that Browning
must have been included for the limited purpose of making explicit a
courts' authority to sanction clients.74 Browning, however, stands for
more than the narrow proposition that clients can be sanctioned. A
close reading of the case shows that the court in Browning actually
held that clients could be sanctioned if they violated the bad faith stan-
dard set forth in section 1927. 71 The analogous application to Rule 11,
therefore, is that clients can be sanctioned if they violate the objective
standard set forth in Rule 11.
The application of the objective standard is further supported by the
language following the Advisory Committee's cite to Browning. The
Committee states that the modification allowing sanctions against a
client "brings Rule 11 in line with practice under Rule 37, which
allows sanctions for abuses during discovery to be imposed upon the
party, the attorney, or both."7 6 Just as the 1983 amendment to Rule
11 removed the subjective good faith requirement, the 1970 amend-
ment to Rule 37 removed the requirement that parties or attorneys act
willfully to be sanctioned, and substituted this with an objective stan-
dard.7 7 The application of Rule 11 to clients will be in line with the
practice of Rule 37 only if clients and attorneys are held to the same
objective standard of conduct.
b. Bad Faith Assessment
The Committee Note provides additional support for the objective
standard in a section discussing the role of bad faith in fashioning
sanctions. The Note states that "in considering the nature and sever-
ity of the sanctions to be imposed, the court should take account of the
state of the attorney's or party's actual or presumed knowledge when
the pleading or other paper was signed."' 78 Because the Note requires
the court to focus attention on the good or bad faith of the parties
73. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., 892 F.2d 802 (9th Cir.
1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 3235 (1990).
74. Id at 811. This conclusion is less persuasive because the Advisory Committee could have
cited from a group of Supreme Court cases that indicated clients can be held accountable for bad
faith conduct. See W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL EmIcs 927 (1986).
75. Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1089 (2d Cir.
1977).
76. Committee Note, supra note 5, at 200.
77. FED. R. Civ. P. 37 advisory committee's note; see Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357
U.S. 197, 208 (1958) (defining the standard of Rule 37). Under Rule 37 clients can be sanctioned
for negligent good faith acts. Marquis v. Chrysler Corp., 577 F.2d 624, 642 (9th Cir. 1978).
78. Committee Note, supra note 5, at 200; See supra note 64 and accompanying text
(discussing the bad faith analysis in Business Guides).
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when the particular sanction is selected, it must be true that a good
faith action by a party may constitute a violation of the rule.
c. Reduced Level of Reasonableness
The Committee Note also indicates that the subjective good faith
test of Calloway is not necessary to accommodate a client's reduced
level of skill and responsibility relative to an attorney. The Committee
stated that "[t]he standard is one of reasonableness under the circum-
stances. "79 As the court in Business Guides noted, clients and attorneys
act under different circumstances.80 Thus, each will be expected to
operate according to different levels of objective reasonableness. Since
the varying circumstances of clients and attorneys can be accommo-
dated through a lessened level of reasonable inquiry, there is no need
to read into the rule a separate standard of good faith for clients.
3. Public Policy Support
Applying the objective standard of reasonable inquiry to repre-
sented parties best achieves the goals of Rule 11 to deter frivolous liti-
gation, compensate the targets of such litigation, and punish violators
of the rule.
a. Deterrence
The deterrence of frivolous litigation has been identified as the pri-
mary goal of amended Rule 11.8 Applying the objective standard to
clients will increase Rule l1's power to deter factually frivolous
claims. Clients will be less likely to submit papers to a court without
making a reasonable investigation into the factual basis of a claim if
they know they will be personally liable for a violation of the rule.8 2
Conversely, applying the subjective good faith standard would cre-
ate less incentive for clients to investigate their factual claims, because
liability for any violations would likely rest solely with their attorneys.
Furthermore, the subjective standard may be a disincentive for investi-
gation. When a good faith standard is applied, clients can avoid vio-
lating the standard by not investigating. So long as clients do not
79. Committee Note, supra note 5, at 198 (emphasis added).
80. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., 892 F.2d 802 (9th Cir.
1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 3235 (1990).
81. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx, 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2454 (1990) (central purpose of the Rule is
deterrence); see also supra notes 15, 18 and accompanying text (discussing deterrence).
82. As the Eleventh Circuit commented, "monetary sanctions may be the most effective way
to deter a powerful and wealthy party from bringing frivolous or vexatious litigation."
Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1557 (1lth Cir. 1987).
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know that a claim is factually frivolous, they will not violate the sub-
jective good faith standard.
b. Compensation
When courts apply the objective rather than subjective standard to
clients, parties who have been the targets of frivolous litigation have a
better chance of receiving compensation for their costs and attorney's
fees. The compensation goal will be advanced because the objective
standard increases the likelihood that a client can be held liable for
sanctions. Thus, a victim of a frivolous suit will have the opposing
client as an additional source of recovery. 3
The need to hold clients liable for compensatory purposes was
increased by the recent Supreme Court decision in Pavelic & Leflore v.
Marvel Entertainment Group. 84 In that case the Court held that law
firms are not liable for Rule 11 sanctions imposed upon individual
attorneys. 85 Thus, if an attorney cannot satisfy a judgment, the client
will be the only other available source of compensation.86
c. Punishment
The objective test will also prove more effective for punishing plain-
tiffs who submit claims that are not well grounded in fact, because the
sanction can be levied against the party directly responsible for failing
to make a reasonable inquiry into the facts of a frivolous claim. The
importance of the punitive function of Rule 11 was recognized in Mer-
cury Service, Inc v. Allied Bank of Texas, 7 where the court noted that
several "district courts have imposed Rule 11 sanctions facially
designed more to punish the transgressor than to compensate the
opposing party for wasted effort." 8 The importance of the punitive
function is closely tied with the deterrence effect of Rule 11. Both will
83. For example, if the Business Guides court had not applied the objective standard of
reasonable inquiry to hold the plaintiff liable for sanctions, the defendant Chromatic
Communications would not have been compensated. Sanctions could not have been levied
against Business Guide's law firm because the firm went bankrupt. See Business Guides, 892 F.2d
at 807.
84. 110 S. Ct. 456 (1989).
85. Id at 460.
86. In cases such as Calloway, where the district court issued a $100,000 sanction, there is an
increased chance that an individual attorney will not have the funds to satisfy the judgment. See
Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 854 F.2d 1452, 1474 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd in part on
other grounds sub nor., Pavelic & Leflore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 110 S. Ct. 456 (1989).
87. 117 F.RtD. 147 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
88. Id at 157.
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be advanced by sanctioning clients who fail to make a reasonable
inquiry into their factual claims.
B. A Reduced Level of Objectively Reasonable Inquiry for Clients
The language of Rule 11, the Advisory Committee Note, and the
achievement of the goals of the rule clearly require the objective stan-
dard. Strong public policies, however, support holding clients to a
lower level of responsibility than attorneys. This can be accomplished
by applying a reduced level of objectively reasonable inquiry to clients.
1. Higher Level of Conduct for Attorneys
In Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 9 the Second Circuit
correctly noted that attorneys should be held to a higher standard of
conduct than clients, due to the status of attorneys as licensed profes-
sionals and officers of the court.9° The importance of holding attorneys
to a higher standard of care is also supported by the practical aspects
of litigation. Attorneys are in charge of the litigation and are in the
best position to know what type of reasonable inquiry is needed. This
is especially true where attorneys must exercise their legal judgement
to determine the appropriate level of inquiry.91 Under these circum-
stances, the attorney should be responsible both for directing addi-
tional inquiry, and for exercising a higher standard of care than
clients. Clients should not, however, be entirely excused from a duty
to make a reasonable inquiry into the factual basis of a claim. Often
they are in a better position to determine if the facts are accurate, and
should share this responsibility with their attorney.
Courts must reconcile the need to hold attorneys to a higher stan-
dard of conduct than clients, with the need to hold clients, who have
control of the facts, responsible for frivolous claims. This can be
accomplished if courts apply a reduced level of objectively reasonable
inquiry to clients. Since the language of Rule 11 and the Committee
Note require an objective standard, a reduced objective standard for
clients is the best method available to allow courts to impose primary
responsibility on attorneys, but also allow sanctions against clients
89. 854 F.2d 1452 (2d Cir. 1988), rey'd in part on other grounds sub nom., Pavelic & Leflore
v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 110 S. Ct. 456 (1989).
90. Id. at 1474.
91. See, e.g., Witzsche v. Jaeger & Haines, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 407, 409-10 (W.D. Ark. 1989)
(alleged facts could not legally have supported an inference of discrimination, so attorney should
have conducted more investigation).
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who should have known their factual allegations were not
supportable.92
2. Avoiding the Problems of Rule 11
A reduced level of reasonable inquiry should also be applied to cli-
ents to avoid the problems associated with Rule 11. These problems
include chilling legitimate litigation, creating excessive satellite litiga-
tion, and harming the attorney-client relationship.
a. Chilling Legitimate Litigation
Applying the objective standard to clients may increase the poten-
tial chilling effect of Rule 11. Because the more stringent objective
standard increases the possibility that a client will be personally liable
for violations, clients will be less likely to bring legitimate, but difficult,
factual claims.93 The Advisory Committee, judges, and commentators
have all expressed concern about the potential chilling effect of the
Rule.94 The most seriously threatened group of clients will be those
bringing civil rights, antitrust, and other types of claims in which the
facts are largely in the defendant's control.95 One study indicated that
civil rights plaintiffs are the subject of 28.1% of reported Rule 11
cases, and that 71.5% of these motions succeed.96 In contrast, only
54.2% of the motions against other types of plaintiffs succeed.97 A
more recent study found the disparity between the sanction rates of
civil rights and non-civil rights plaintiffs to be greater, but determined
that suits were brought against civil rights plaintiffs less frequently. 98
While it is difficult to determine how many legitimate civil rights cases
have not been brought because of the fear of Rule 11 sanctions, this
data indicates that the rule has been applied somewhat more often to
civil rights plaintiffs than to other types of plaintiffs. Moreover, once
92. The Business Guides court correctly noted that clients should be held to the objective
standard because pro se litigants are held to this standard. See supra note 58. Clients should,
however, be held to a reduced level of inquiry relative to pro se litigants. Pro se litigants, unlike
represented clients, assume the responsibilities of attorneys and must comply with the rules of
procedural and substantive law. W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETmics 804 (1986).
93. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (discussing the chilling effect).
94. Id.
95. See Nelken, supra note 4, at 1340-41 (discussing cases where the facts could not be
investigated until after discovery because the facts were in the defendant's control).
96. Vairo, supra note 2, at 200-01.
97. IM:
98. Burbank, supra note 24, at 61, 69. The study found that 20.7% of Rule 11 cases are
aimed at civil rights plaintiffs, while civil rights cases made up 16% of all the civil filings studied.
While 47.1% of these motions succeeded, only 8.5% of the motions against non-civil rights
plaintiffs were granted.
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Rule 11 motions have been filed, civil rights plaintiffs are much more
likely to be sanctioned. This increased activity threatens to cross the
line from deterrence to the chilling of legitimate litigation.
Balanced against this threat is the Rule's purpose to deter frivolous
suits.99 Rule 11 was amended to address widespread concerns about
abuses of the legal process and increasingly clogged court dockets.
According to the drafters of the amended rule, unmeritorious lawsuits
proceeded too easily into the burdensome discovery stage of litigation.
As a result, they drafted a rule designed to discourage frivolous suits
through both the early and latter stages of the litigation process."°
This goal must be recognized when selecting the appropriate standard
for clients.
Applying the reduced level of reasonable inquiry to clients strikes a
fair balance between these competing interests. The reduced level
gives effect to the deterrence goal, and mitigates the chilling effect of
the objective standard. Under this modified standard clients will be
sanctioned only if they fail to perform the investigation that would be
reasonable according to their abilities. This standard recognizes the
attorney's greater ability to direct relevant factual inquiry, and accom-
modates the types of litigation where the facts are largely in the
defendant's control.101
The reasonable litigant standard, however, will not reduce the chil-
ling effect of Rule 11 unless courts clearly define the factors that will
be considered when determining what is reasonable for a client. Cli-
ents must be able to predict what level of inquiry courts will enforce,
because otherwise uncertainty about the appropriate level of inquiry
will further discourage legitimate claims. Courts should consider the
following four factors when determining the appropriate level of rea-
sonable inquiry: (1) the client's legal sophistication; (2) the degree to
which the client must rely on legal advice to guide appropriate investi-
gation; (3) the complexity of the case; and (4) whether the facts are in
the client's control. These factors, which focus on the background of
the client and the nature of the case, will help courts measure the
degree of reasonable inquiry that should be expected of a client.
When applied, these factors can protect plaintiffs in potentially
legitimate cases from fearing sanctions. For example, in Witzsche v.
Jaeger & Haines, Inc., 11 2 the plaintiff claimed she had been fired
99. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text (discussing deterrence).
100. A. MILLER, supra note 7, at 9-10.
101. This standard is more in line with the liberal pleading requirement of FED. R. Civ. P. 8.
See Nelken, supra note 4, at 1342.
102. 707 F. Supp. 407 (W.D. Ark. 1989).
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because she was pregnant. The court found her civil rights claim to be
factually frivolous, because she had no proof that in the prior two
years the seven women who had been terminated after becoming preg-
nant were terminated because of their pregnancies. 10 3 While her case
was not complex, the plaintiff was not legally sophisticated. Further,
the investigation into the alleged facts depended on a legal knowledge
of disparate impact theory, and the relevant facts were largely in the
defendant's control."° Because of these factors, the plaintiff should
not reasonably have been expected to discover the factual inadequacy
of her allegation through investigation.
When applied to the facts of Calloway, however, the same four fac-
tors require the imposition of sanctions against the plaintiff. In Callo-
way the plaintiff claimed that his signature on the contract in question
had been forged.10 While the plaintiff was not legally sophisticated
and the case was relatively complicated,106 sanctions should have been
imposed because the facts supporting these claims were in the client's
control, 07 and investigation into the accuracy of these claims did not
depend on an understanding of any legal theories.' 08 Consequently,
the plaintiff could reasonably have discovered the factual inadequacies
of his claims through investigation. These two cases illustrate how a
reduced objective standard can protect plaintiffs who submit poten-
tially meritorious claims, which are based on facts they would not rea-
sonably be able to verify through investigation, and how clients who
should have known their claims were inaccurate can be sanctioned.
b. Satellite Litigation
Supporters of the subjective standard argue that the application of
the objective standard to clients may create excessive satellite litiga-
tion,1 9 further clogging court dockets and adding to the expense of
litigation. Satellite litigation results when additional hearings and dis-
103. Id at 409.
104. The reasons for the termination of the female employees is assumed to be in the
defendant employer's control, as is often the case in civil rights cases. See Nelken, supra note 4,
at 1341 (discussing cases where claims can be developed only after discovery).
105. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (discussing Calloway's claim).
106. Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 854 F.2d 1452, 1456-67 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd
in part on other grounds sub nor., Pavelic & Leflore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 110 S. Ct.
456 (1989) (discussing the facts of the case).
107. See id at 1459, 1464 (Calloway had the original contract).
108. The claim depended merely on Calloway's denial that he signed the contract. See id at
1468.
109. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit at 18, cert. granted, Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., 110 S.
Ct 3235 (Jun. 25, 1990) (No. 89-1500).
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covery requests are needed to determine what level of inquiry to
expect of a client,"' to decide whether a client or attorney is responsi-
ble for the violation, and to apportion sanctions." 1 The legitimacy of
these concerns is strengthened by the views of courts and commenta-
tors who have indicated that Rule 11 motions have been made rou-
tinely and that "Rule 11 has added substantially to the volume of
motions in the district courts and appeals in the circuit courts.""' 2
Applying the objective standard to clients, however, should not signifi-
cantly increase the potential for satellite litigation. While the objective
standard increases the need for extra evidentiary hearings on the issues
of the client's legal knowledge and responsibility for the violation, the
subjective standard is just as likely, if not more so, to require addi-
tional hearings. Courts may have difficulty determining the subjective
state of mind of a party without holding separate evidentiary hearings.
Indeed, the difficulty of proving state of mind has been cited as one of
the primary reasons that Rule 11 was ineffective prior to the 1983
amendment. 1 3
While the application of the objective standard to clients poses a
small risk of increased satellite litigation, this risk will be further
reduced by applying the reduced level of reasonable inquiry to clients.
If clients and attorneys are treated as having the same duty under the
objective standard they will need additional apportionment hearings.
However, if courts apply the reduced level of reasonable inquiry,
determined according to the four suggested factors, they will often be
able to determine from the record what the client should have known
about a factually frivolous claim.' 14
c. Attorney-Client Relationship
When courts allocate sanctions between clients and attorneys, the
risk of poisoning the attorney-client relationship is at its greatest. If
both attorneys and clients are held to a standard of reasonable inquiry,
litigation involving the allocation of sanctions may pit attorney against
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1178-79 (1985) (case remanded to
district court to allocate sanctions based on specific findings).
112. Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1018 (1988); see generally supra
note 27 and accompanying text (discussing satellite litigation).
113. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty of the good faith
standard).
114. See Muthig v. Brant Point Nantucket, Inc., 838 F.2d 600, 607 (1st Cir. 1988). In Muthig
it would have been easy to determine from the record that the clients should not have been
sanctioned, because the existence of factually frivolous claims depended on knowledge of the
legal theory of fraud.
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client, as each tries to prove who should have uncovered factually
groundless claims.11 This sort of dispute at the end of litigation
destroys the attorney-client relationship, and may lead to the disclo-
sure of privileged information.' 6 This threat to the sanctity of privi-
leged communications may inhibit the disclosure of important
information from client to attorney early in the litigation.
While the attorney-client relationship may be harmed.by the objec-
tive standard, it is equally threatened by the subjective standard.
Under both standards attorneys can receive the full sanction, and so
under both standards attorneys will have a motive to shift sanctions
from themselves to their clients. This motive alone threatens to dam-
age the attorney-client relationship, and force the disclosure of privi-
leged information, regardless of which standard is employed." 7
The objective test is better, however, because any harm it may cause
the attorney-client relationship at the sanctioning stage of litigation is
offset by the benefit derived at the outset of litigation. One of the
drafters of Rule 11 indicated that its main purpose was to force attor-
neys to "stop, and think" before entering into litigation." 8 The objec-
tive standard forces clients and attorneys to stop and think about their
factual claims together. This goal is not accomplished under the sub-
jective standard. When applied to clients, the subjective standard cre-
ates a conflict of interest for the attorney. Because any sanctions for
factually frivolous claims will likely be levied against the attorney, the
attorney may be more motivated to avoid sanctions than to vigorously
represent the client." 9 When the objective standard us applied, how-
ever, and clients can be more easily held personally liable, the client
and attorney have the same interests and motivations. This will allow
the attorney to fully represent the interests of the client. Clients will
115. In Calloway the court noted the conflict of interest between the attorney and the client.
Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 854 F.2d 1452, 1473 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd in part on
other grounds sub nor., Pavelic & Leflore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 110 S. Ct. 456
(1989).
116. The Advisory Committee stated that "[t]he rule does not require a party or an attorney
to disclose privileged communications." Committee Note, supra note 5, at 199. The American
Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct, however, allow an attorney to reveal
confidences "necessary... to establish a defense to a... claim against the lawyer based upon
conduct in which the client was involved." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule
1.6 (1989).
117. Under a good faith regime, exchanges between attorney and'client are relevant to
showing the client's state of mind.
118. MILLER, supra note 7, at 15.
119. For example, in a recent case an attorney required his client to indemnify him for any
Rule I 1 sanctions before the attorney agreed to take the case. Schaffer v. Chicago Police Officers,
120 F.R.D. 514, 515 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
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also be inclined to work more cooperatively with their attorneys under
the objective standard, because they will know they can be held per-
sonally liable for a violation. This will result in better communication
between attorney and client, and thus enhance their relationship.
The benefit of the reduced level of objectively reasonable inquiry for
clients in this context will be the maintenance of the attorney's role as
the expert and director of litigation. The attorney-client relationship
depends in part on the client's trust in the attorney to act according to
high professional standards and to give sound legal advice. This role
will be maintained because attorneys will be held to a higher standard
of care than clients.
III. CONCLUSION
In Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enter-
prises, 20 the Ninth Circuit correctly required clients to make an objec-
tively reasonable investigation into the factual basis of claims
submitted to the court. This approach best adheres to the language of
Rule 11 and the Advisory Committee Note, and it best effectuates the
purposes of Rule 11 to deter, compensate, and punish.
Courts applying Rule 11 to clients, however, should hold them to a
reduced level of objective reasonableness relative to attorneys. The
level of inquiry expected of a client should be determined according to
a uniform set of factors based on the client's background, and the
nature of the case. This reduced level will enforce the public policy of
holding attorneys to a higher level of care than clients, and will also
mitigate the danger that applying the objective standard to clients will
chill legitimate litigation, create excessive satellite litigation, and harm
the attorney-client relationship.
Peter Ramels
120. 892 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 3235 (1990).
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